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 STRATEGIC LABELING AND TRADE OF GMOS 
Abstract: This paper systematically analyzes the strategic effects of national regulatory decisions on 
labeling of GM products and identifies the determinants of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium labeling 
regimes in a small number of producing countries that compete for access in the world market for an 






STRATEGIC LABELING AND TRADE OF GMOS 
The emergence of agricultural biotechnology and the subsequent introduction of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) into the food system have been among the most controversial issues surrounding the 
increasingly scrutinized agri-food system. While agricultural producers have responded to the agronomic 
benefits associated with the new technology and have been adopting GM crops in increasing numbers, 
consumers around the world have expressed an aversion to food products containing GM ingredients. 
Consumer opposition to GM products varies significantly both between and within countries and is founded 
on health, environmental, ethical and/or philosophical concerns about agricultural biotechnology (Hobbs 
and Plunkett, 2002; Giannakas and Fulton, 2002). 
Similarly diverse have been the countries’ regulatory responses to GMOs with the issue of labeling 
being a focal point in policy forums around the world. For instance, while the United States (US) oppose 
the labeling of GM products arguing the “substantial equivalence” between the current, producer-oriented 
GM products and their conventional counterparts, the European Union has introduced mandatory labeling 
of GM products on the basis of its “precautionary principle” and the expressed consumer aversion to these 
products (see Sheldon (2004) for a comprehensive review of the policy debate between the EU and the US 
on the regulation of GMOs. On issues related to the labeling of GM products see also Caswell (1998), 
Runge and Jackson (2000), Crespi and Marette (2003), Fulton and Giannakas (2004)).   
Consumer opposition to GM products (or its luck thereof) is often cited as the primary force behind 
countries’ decisions on the labeling of these products. While consumer reaction is certainly an important 
factor, there are other parameters that are also significant in shaping the regulatory responses to the products 
of biotechnology. In particular, given the high volume of trade of agricultural and food products and the 
intense competition between the major suppliers for access in the world market, a country’s decision on its 
labeling regime can be expected to affect and be affected by the regulatory and labeling regimes of the other 
major suppliers of the product(s) in question. Interestingly, this strategic interdependence between the major 
producers of agri-food products has, to our knowledge, been ignored by the relevant literature.   
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The objective of this paper is to explicitly consider the effect of the strategic interdependence 
between countries on their regulatory responses to products of biotechnology. In particular, the paper 
analyzes the strategic effects of national regulatory decisions on labeling of GM products and identifies 
the determinants of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium labeling regimes in a small number of 
producing countries that supply the world market for an agricultural product.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the methodology and 
assumptions employed in our analysis. Sections III and IV examine the producer and consumer decisions 
under alternative labeling regimes. Section V derives the equilibrium conditions in the world market 
under various labeling regimes and different scenarios on the market power of the trading sector. Section 
VI derives the payoff matrix of the game and identifies the conditions that facilitate alternative Nash 
equilibria in labeling strategies. Section VII summarizes and concludes the paper.  
 
II.  METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Our stylized model considers three producing regions that supply the world market of a product. Two of 
these regions (termed hereafter as “Countries 1 and 2” or “Players 1 and 2”), have adopted the GM 
technology and seek to determine their labeling regime (i.e., whether to label their GM and conventional 
produce or not). The third producing region represents the rest of the producing regions in the world 
(termed hereafter as “rest of the world” or “R.O.W.”). The R.O.W. has not adopted the new technology 
and supplies the world market with non-labeled conventional products.   
As mentioned previously, the focus of our analysis is on the strategic interdependence between 
Countries 1 and 2 and its effect on the formulation of their labeling strategies. This strategic interaction is 
modeled as a strategic game where the two GM producing countries determine their labeling regimes 
non-cooperatively. In particular, Countries 1 and 2 decide on whether to label their GM and conventional 
products or not independently but aware that their labeling strategies affect each others payoffs. The 
objective of each GM producing region is to determine the labeling regime that maximizes the economic  
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welfare of its producers. Since all regions export their produce to the world market, maximizing producer 
welfare is equivalent to maximizing total economic surplus in these countries.  
Once the regulatory regimes have been determined, farmers in each producing region decide on 
which crop to grow and consumers make their purchasing decisions observing the types and prices of 
products supplied to the world market. Our analysis assumes fixed proportions between the farm output and 
the final consumer product. To retain tractability, all processing and marketing costs are normalized to zero.  
It is important to note that the labeling decision of a country affects the nature of its produce as 
well as the nature of products supplied to the world market. For instance, while the adoption of mandatory 
labeling results in the creation of two separate supply channels for GM and conventional products, the 
absence of a labeling requirement results in the GM and conventional crops/products being marketed 
together as a non-labeled good. Table 1 shows the nature of the products supplied to the world market 
under the different combinations of labeling strategies of Countries 1 and 2.  
  
Table 1: Products Supplied Under Different Labeling Regimes 
Country 2   
























As shown in Table 1, four distinct scenarios emerge:  
Scenario 1:   Countries 1 and 2 label their produce and two separate supply channels for GM and 
conventional products emerge. Note that, since all GM products are required to be labeled 
as such, non-labeled products supplied by the R.O.W. will be (correctly) perceived by 
consumer as being conventional (non-GM).   
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Scenario 2:   No country labels its products. GM and conventional products are marketed together as a 
non-labeled good. Since GM products are credence goods (Darby and Karni, 1973), 
consumers cannot observe the (GM or conventional) nature of the product supplied.  
Scenario 3:   Country 2 adopts mandatory labeling, while Country 1 does not label its products. Under 
this scenario, there are three products supplied to the market: the GM-labeled product, the 
non-labeled product, and the conventional-labeled product.  
Scenario 4:   Country 1 adopts mandatory labeling, while Country 2 does not label its products. The 
products supplied in this case are the same as those under Scenario 3.   
 
As mentioned previously, the objective of each GM producing country is to determine the 
labeling regime that maximizes the welfare of its producers. For a Nash equilibrium in labeling strategies 
to exist, the equilibrium labeling strategy of each country should be the best response to the other 
country’s equilibrium labeling strategy. Put in a different way, a profile of labeling strategies is a Nash 
equilibrium, when no country has incentives to deviate, i.e., no country can enhance the welfare of its 
producers by changing its labeling policy. In this context, to evaluate the plausibility of the different 
scenarios in constituting a Nash equilibrium, we need to determine the welfare of each country’s 
producers for each of the four scenarios identified above.  
Note that, in each scenario, different actors pursuing different objectives are making different 
decisions. For instance, producers in each supplying country decide whether to grow GM crops or not, 
while consumers in the world market decide whether to buy these products or not. To capture the partial 
adoption of the GM technology in the major producing regions around the world, this paper explicitly 
accounts for producer heterogeneity in terms of the returns they receive from the different crops. 
Similarly, to capture the diversity in consumer attitudes toward the products of biotechnology expressed 
in survey and various stated consumer preference studies around the world, the paper follows Giannakas 
and Fulton (2002) and explicitly accounts for heterogeneous consumer preferences for GM and 
conventional products.   
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III.  PRODUCTION DECISIONS 
This section analyzes farmer production decisions in the counties that have adopted the GM technology 
under the different scenarios on labeling regimes presented in Table 1. The models of producer 
heterogeneity developed here are similar in spirit to the models by Giannakas (2002) and Fulton and 
Giannakas (2004) that analyze production decisions under imperfect enforcement of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) and different regulatory and labeling regimes for products of biotechnology, respectively, in 
the context of a country that has adopted the GM technology.   
Production Decisions in Countries Having Adopted the New Technology  
Mandatory Labeling: Production Decisions in Country i 
As mentioned previously, producers in each producing region are assumed to differ in the net returns receive 
from the different crops. Let A∈[0, A] denote the attribute that differentiates producers. For tractability, 
producers are assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and A. Consider a farmer with differentiating 
attribute A in country i( {} 2 , 1 ∈ i ), that decides whether to produce the GM crop, the conventional crop or an 










t t w A P + − = β π         If a unit of conventional crop is produced 
0 = a π         If a unit of alternative crop is produced 
Without loss of generality, farmers are assumed to produce only one unit, and the net returns to the 
alternative crop are normalized to zero. 
S
gm P  and 
S
t P  stand for the unit farm prices of the GM and 




t P  (i.e., the conventional crop receives a premium over the 
GM crop). 
l
gmi w  and 
l
ti w  denote the base per unit costs associated with the production of the GM and 
conventional crops, respectively, under the labeling regime. The base costs of production are common to 
all producers and encompass such things as the cost of seeds and pest management. To capture the 
producer orientation of the first generation of GM products, 
l
ti w  is assumed to exceed 
l
gmi w .   
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The parameters  i α  and  i β  are cost enhancement factors associated with the production of GM 
and conventional crops in Country i, respectively. Thus, the terms  A i α  and  A i β  capture the producer 
heterogeneity in terms of the costs associated with the production of the two crops which stems from 
differences in location and quality of the land, education, experience, management skills etc. Note that the 
total costs associated with the unit production of the GM and conventional crops for the producer with 
differentiating attribute A are given by 
l
gmi i w A+ α  and 
l
ti i w A+ β , respectively.  
To capture the observed coexistence of markets for conventional and GM products,  i α  is 
assumed greater than  i β  with the difference  i i β α −  capturing the cost effectiveness of the GM 
technology. The smaller is the difference  i i β α − , the more cost effective is the GM technology and the 
greater is the share of producers that find it optimal to grow the GM crop. 
A farmer’s production decision is determined by the relative returns associated with the different 
crops. Figure 1 graphs  gm π  and  t π  and illustrates the farmer production decisions when the price and 
cost parameters are such that both crops enjoy positive production shares (i.e., the GM technology is non-
drastic; see below). The farmer with differentiating attribute  gmi A   (determined by the intersection of 
gm π  and  t π ) is indifferent between producing the conventional and GM crops – the net returns 
associated with the production of these crops are the same. Farmers located to the left of  gmi A  (i.e. 
producers with  ) , 0 [ gmi A A∈ ) find it profitable to produce GM crops. Since producers have been assumed 
to be uniformly distributed within 0 and A,  gmi A  gives the quantity of the GM crop produced in Country 















=   (1)  
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Similarly the farmer with differentiate attribute  Ti A  is indifferent between producing the GM and the 
alternative crops.  Ti A  is determined by the intersection of the  gm π  and  s π curves in Figure 1, and gives 
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gm w P w P − ≤ −  the adoption of the GM 










gm w P w P − ≥ −
β
α
 all producers will adopt the GM technology (i.e., the GM technology will 
be drastic). To focus on the empirically relevant case of partial adoption of the GM technology (i.e., the 
case in which the GM technology is non-drastic), our analysis assumes that 

















Aggregate producer welfare under the labeling regime is given by the area underneath the 
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− = Π   (6)  
 
8
No Labeling: Production Decisions in Country i 
Under a no labeling regime, the farm price for GM and conventional crops is the same and the net returns 










nl t w A P + − = β π         If a unit of conventional crop is produced 
0 = a π         If a unit of alternative crop is produced 
where 
S
nl P  is the farm price when the GM and conventional crops are marketed together. 
nl
gmi w  and 
nl
ti w  
are the per unit base costs of producing the GM and conventional crops, respectively, under a no labeling 
regime. Note that the base costs of producing the two crops differ under the two labeling regimes due to 
the segregation costs associated with mandatory labeling.   
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=   (9) 
  Figure 2 graphs the net return functions and the quantities of the different crops under the no 
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. Aggregate producer welfare in Countryi under a no 
labeling regime is given by the area underneath the bold kinked curve in Figure 2 and equals: 
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− = Π   (10)  
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Production Decisions in the Rest Of the World   
Since, by assumption, the R.O.W. has not adopted the GM technology, the production decision of its farmers 
is reduced to the choice between the conventional crop and its alternative. Given that the R.O.W. does not 
label its conventional product, the net returns function for a farmer with differentiating attribute A is given by: 
) ( 3 3 t
S
nl t w A P + − = β π         If a unit of conventional crop is produced 
0 = a π         If a unit of alternative crop is produced 











=    (11) 
Figure 3 depicts the determination of  3 nl A .  
 
Determination of the World Supplies 
The total world supply for each product under the different labeling scenarios outlined in Table 1 is 
derived through the summation of the relevant quantities supplied by each producing region. In Scenario 
1, for instance, two separate supply channels for GM and conventional products emerge. Recall that, since 
all GM products are segregated and labeled as such, products supplied by the R.O.W. would be correctly 
perceived by consumers as being conventional (i.e., non-GM). In this context, the summation of the GM 
quantities supplied by Countries 1 and 2 give the total supply of the GM product; while the summation of 
the conventional produce supplied by each region gives the total supply of the conventional product. The 
determination of aggregate supplies for the GM and conventional products is illustrated in Figure 4. The 
mathematical expressions for the total supplies under all four scenarios are presented below.  
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gm iw hw dw w i c w h b A a g aA P + + + − + − + + + =   (13) 
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= i    
  It should be pointed out that, in the presence of market power by the life science sector, the base 
cost of producing the GM crop varies with the configuration of labeling strategies employed by Countries 
1 and 2. In particular, it can be shown that when both countries label their products 
() () () ()























 where c is the constant marginal cost of producing 
the GM technology, and  gm χ  stands for the conjectural variation elasticity of the life science sector. In 
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World Supply under Scenario 2 (No country labels its products) 
In the absence of labeling, only one supply channel emerges (see Figure 5). The aggregate world supply of  











nl dw cw bw aA P + + + =   (14) 
World Supplies under Scenarios 3 and 4 (One country labels its products) 
In these scenarios, only one of the countries that have adopted the GM technology labels its products. 
When only Country 1(2) labels its products, the quantities of GM and conventional products supplied by 
this country correspond to the world supplies of these products. The aggregate supply of the non-labeled 
product is then determined by the quantities produced by Country 2(1) and the R.O.W. in Scenario 4(3).  
Specifically, the world supplies under Scenarios 3 and 4 are:  
 
11













3 + + = β β   (15) 
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Figure 6 depicts the determination of aggregate supplies under Scenario 4. 
 
IV.  CONSUMPTION DECISIONS AND DETERMINATION OF GLOBAL DEMANDS  
This section focuses on consumer purchasing decisions under each of the scenarios presented in Table 1. 
For simplicity, a unique consuming region encompassing the world consumers is considered. The 
methodological framework utilized in the analysis of consumer behavior derives from the models of vertical 
product differentiation developed by Giannakas and Fulton (2002) and Fulton and Giannakas (2004). This 
framework of analysis allows for heterogeneous consumer preferences for GM and conventional products.   
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Consumption Decisions under Scenario 1 (Both countries label their products) 
Let c∈[0, C] be the attribute that differentiates consumers. Its value differs according to consumer 
capturing the diversity in consumer attitudes towards GM and conventional products. Consider a 
consumer with differentiating attribute c. Assuming that this consumer buys one unit of either the GM, 
the conventional or a substitute product and that this purchase represents a small share of his total budget, 
his utility can be expressed as:   
c P U U
D
gm gm λ − − =
1       If a unit of GM product is consumed 
µc P U U
D
t t − − =
1     If a unit of conventional product is consumed 
s s P U U − =     If a unit of a substitute product is consumed 
U is a per unit base level of utility associated with the consumption of a product and it is common to all 
consumers. 
D
gm P , 
D
t P  and  s P  denote the retail prices of the GM, the conventional and the substitute 
product, respectively. λ
 
and µ  are positive utility discount factors associated with the consumption of 
the GM and conventional products, respectively, so that the terms  c λ  and  c µ  represent the utility 
discount from the consumption of the GM and conventional products for the consumer with 
differentiating attribute c. To capture the expressed consumer opposition to GM products, we assume that 
µ λ > with the difference  µ λ −  capturing the level of consumer aversion to GM products. To save on 
notation, we assume that all consumers place the same value on the substitute product.  
A consumer’s purchasing decision is determined by the relative utilities associated with the 
consumption of the different products. Figure 7 graphs  gm U ,  t U  and  s U  and illustrates the consumer 
purchasing decisions for the case in which all products enjoy positive shares of the market. The consumer 
with differentiating attribute  gm c  (determined by the intersection of  gm U  and  t U ) is indifferent between 
purchasing the conventional product and its GM counterpart – the utility associated with the consumption 
of these products is the same.   
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Consumers located to the left of  gm c  (i.e., consumers with differentiating attribute c∈[0,  gm c )) 
prefer the GM product while consumers located to the right of  gm c  opt buying either the conventional 
product (consumers with c∈( gm c ,  T c ]) or the substitute product (consumers with c∈( T c , C]). If consumers 
are uniformly distributed between 0 and C,  gm c  gives the quantity of the GM product consumed in the 
world market under Scenario 1, 
1 S












1   (21) 









=   (22) 
while, subtracting 
1 S
gm  x  from 
1 S


















1   (23) 
The inverse consumer demands for the GM and conventional products can then be written as: 





gm λx µx P P − − =  (24) 





t x µx P P µ − − =  (25) 
Note that, due to their vertical product differentiation, for both the GM and conventional products to 
enjoy positive consumer demands, the price of the substitute has to be greater than the price of the 
conventional product which, in turn, has to be greater than the price of the GM product. Thus, to allow for 
both GM and conventional products to enjoy positive market shares when Countries 1 and 2 label their 




t s P P P > > .  
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Consumption Decisions under Scenario 2 (No country labels its products) 
In this scenario, GM and conventional products are marketed together as a non-labeled good. Consumers 
have the choice between the non-labeled product and the substitute and the utility function becomes:  
() c P U U E
D
nl nl φ − − =
2     If a unit of non-labeled product is consumed 
s s P U U − =     If a unit of the substitute product is consumed 
where 
2 D
nl P  is the retail price of the non-labeled product, and φ  is the discount factor associated with its 
consumption. Due to the credence nature of the GM product, consumers cannot distinguish between the 
GM and conventional products. Since consumers are uncertain about the nature of the non-labeled 
product, its consumption is associated with an expected utility (Giannakas and Fulton, 2002). 
Assuming that consumers have rational expectations, the utility derived from the consumption of 
the non-labeled product is proportional to the global rate of adoption of the GM product. The greater is 
the production share of the GM product, ψ, the greater is the perceived probability that the non-labeled 
product is genetically modified, and the lower is the utility associated with its consumption. The utility 
discount factor associated with the consumption of the non-labeled product, φ, is given by: 















nl gm A  being the quantity of GM product supplied by all countries that do not 
label their products, and 
2 S
nl A  being the total quantity of the non-labeled product (which includes the non-
labeled production by the R.O.W.). The parameter ψ can be rewritten as: 
() 2 2 1 1 2
1
gm t gm t S
nl
fw fw ew ew
A
− + − = ψ  with,  () 1 1
1
β α −
= e  and  () 2 2
1
β α −
= f   (27)  
Figure 8 graphs  () nl U E and  s U  as well as the determination of the consumer demand for the non-labeled 
product, 
2 S
nl x , when 
2 D
nl s P P > . Formally, 
2 S
nl x  is given by:   
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x   (28) 
and its inverse form can be written as: 
()





nl x x P P µ ψ µ λ − − − =   (29) 
Note that, in the absence of labeling, the global production share of the GM product affects the consumer 
demand – the consumer demand in the absence of labels is directly related to the supply conditions in the 
market. The greater is the global rate of adoption of the new technology, the lower is the market demand for 
the non-labeled product (on this issue see Giannakas and Fulton (2002) and Fulton and Giannakas (2004)). 
 
Consumption Decisions under Scenarios 3 and 4 (One country labels its products) 
Under Scenarios 3 and 4 there are four products in the market and the consumer utility becomes: 
c P U U
D
gm gm λ − − =     If a unit of GM product is consumed 
() c P U U E
D
nl nl ' φ − − =     If a unit of non-labeled product is consumed 
µc P U U
D
t t − − =     If a unit of conventional product is consumed 







t s P P P P > > >  and  φ φ ≠ '  because  ψ ψ ≠ ' . Figure 9 graphs  gm U ,  () nl U E ,  t U and  s U . 
Note that the global production share of the GM product differs under Scenarios 3 and 4 since the country 
not labeling its produce is different in each case. For instance, when only Country 2 labels its products 










1 1 3 3 − = ψ   (30) 










2 2 4 4 − = ψ   (31) 
The consumer demands for the different products when only one country labels its produce are:  
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  (33) 















=   (34) 
The inverse form of these demands is then: 
() [] gm nl t s
D
gm x x x P P λ µ λ ψ µ µ − − + − − =  (35) 
() [] ( ) [] gm nl t s
D
nl x x x P P µ λ ψ µ µ λ ψ µ µ − + − − + − − =  (36) 
gm nl t s
D
t x x x P P µ µ µ − − − =   (37) 
The relevant expressions for the demands under Scenario 3(4) can be obtained by substituting  3 ψ ( 4 ψ ) 
for ψ  in equations (32)-(37). 
 
V. MARKET OUTCOMES UNDER THE DIFFERENT LABELING SCENARIOS 
In this section the market outcomes for the four scenarios are established based on the results derived 
previously. Utilizing the supply and demand expressions derived in the previous two sections, a simple, 
stylized four-region trade model is developed for each scenario. The equilibrium conditions determine the 
prices and quantities of the relevant products as well as the welfare of the groups involved.  
Market Outcomes under Scenario 1  
Figure 10 depicts the configuration of the world market under Scenario 1 when the trading sector is 
perfectly competitive and trading costs are normalized to zero. In this case, two distinct supply channels 
provide GM and conventional products to consumers in the world market and the prices paid by 
consumers equal to those received by farmers (recall the assumption of fixed proportions and the 








t P P =   (39)  
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The market clearing condition implies that: 





gm x x A = =   (43) 





t x x A = =   (44) 
where 
1 e
gm x  and 
1 e
t x  are the quantities of GM and conventional products traded in the world market, 
respectively.  
  When the trading sector is able to exercise market power both when buying and when selling 
conventional and GM products, the equilibrium quantities traded in the world market are determined by 
the equality of the “marginal revenues” and “marginal expenditures” as perceived by the trading firms in 














gm x a g P x P ME MR x ε θ + + = − ⇒ =   (45) 










t P x a x P ME MR x + = − ⇒ = ε µθ   (46) 
where  gm θ  and  t θ  denote the demand conjectural variation elasticities of the trading sector on the 
markets for GM and conventional products, respectively, and reflect the market power of the trading 
sector when selling these products downstream. Similarly, the parameters  gm ε  and  t ε  are the supply 
conjectural variation elasticities of the trading sector capturing the market power exercised by trading 
firms when procuring the GM and conventional crops from producers. These elasticities take values 
between 0 and 1, with the value of 1 corresponding to a monopoly (monopsony) and a zero value 
corresponding to a perfectly competitive trading sector. 
Substituting the expressions for the derived demands (equations (24) and (25)) and supplies 
(equations (12) and (13)) for the relevant parameters in equations (45) and (46), and solving the system of 
equations we get the equilibrium quantities in the markets for GM and conventional products as:  
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
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D
a i λ g λ a g c
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D
a h λ g λ a g b
P
D
λ g λ a g
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− + + + +
−
+ + − + + + +
−
+ + − + + + +
−
− + + + +
=
(48) 
with  () () () () ( ) ( ) () ( )
2 1 1 1 1 µ ε θ µ θ ε + − + + + + + + + = a a λ a g D t t gm gm  
Substituting equations (47) and (48) into the expressions for farm prices in equation (12) and (13), we get 





1 3 2 1













gm iw hw dw w i c w h b x a g ax P + + + − + − + + + =   (49) 
3 2 1











t dw cw bw ax ax P + + + + =   (50) 
The aggregate producer welfare in Country i under Scenario 1, can be expressed as: 
() () ( )
()
( )
        




















i β β α 2 2
2 * 1 * 1 1 * 1




− = Π   (51) 
Market Outcomes under Scenario 2  
Figure 11 depicts the configuration of the world market under Scenario 2, when the trading sector is 
perfectly competitive. Since no country labels its products in this case, there is only one supply channel 
and the market clearing condition implies that: 
 





nl x x A = =   (52) 
where 
2 e
nl x  is the equilibrium quantity of non-labeled product traded in the world market.  
  When the trading sector can exercise market power both when selling and buying the non-labeled 
product, the equilibrium 
2 e
nl x  is determined by: 
() ( )














nl x a P x x P ME MR x ε µθ ε θ µ λ ψ + = − − − − ⇒ =    (53)  
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where  nl θ  and  nl ε  are the conjectural variation elasticities of the trading sector on the demand and 
supply sides of the market, respectively. Following the same procedure outlined in the previous section, 
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(54) 















        
















i β β α 2 2
2 * 2 2




− = Π    (56) 
Market Outcomes under Scenarios 3 and 4 
Figure 12 depicts the case in which only Country 1 labels its products (i.e., Scenario 4).  As shown in this 
Figure, this scenario involves the emergence of three distinct supply channels: one for the GM, one for the 
conventional, and one for the non-labeled products. The market clearing conditions imply that: 





gm x A x = =    (57) 





t x A x = =    (58) 





nl x A x = =    (59) 
while the equilibrium quantities of GM, conventional and non-labeled products traded in the world market 
(
4 e
gm x , 
4 e
t x  and 
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nl x , respectively) in the presence of market power by the trading sector are given by: 
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Following the same procedure established previously, we derive the equilibrium quantities of the three 
products as: 
() ( ) ( ) ( )
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gm w x x P + + = β α   (68) 
and aggregate producer welfare in Countries 1 and 2 is given by:  
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Following the same process we can get the equilibrium quantities and prices under Scenario 3 as: 
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gm w x x P + + = β α    (76) 
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VI. DETERMINANTS OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN LABELING STRATEGIES 
This section focuses on establishing the conditions under which the different labeling scenarios examined 
previously can constitute a Nash equilibrium in labeling strategies. After having determined the aggregate 
producer welfare in each country under the different labeling scenarios, we can formulate the payoff 
matrix for Countries 1 and 2, as:  
 
Table 2: Payoff Matrix 
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Conditions for Scenario 1 being a Nash equilibrium 
For Scenario 1 to be a Nash equilibrium, no player must have an incentive to deviate from the labeling 
strategy when the other country has chosen to label its products. For labeling to be a country’s best 
response to the other country’s decision to label its products, the following inequalities have to hold: 
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nl l Π > Π  as long as the following inequalities hold:  
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nl l Π > Π  as long as the following inequalities are satisfied (see Figure 14):  
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Conditions for Scenario 2 being a Nash equilibrium 
For Scenario 2 to be a Nash equilibrium, no country should have incentive to adopt a labeling regime 
when the other country has chosen not to label its products. For no labeling to be a country’s best 
response to the other country’s decision to not label its products, the following inequalities have to hold: 
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Conditions for Scenario 3 being a Nash equilibrium 
Scenario 3 will be a Nash equilibrium when the following inequalities hold: 
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or, when: 
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( ) 0 0 2 1
* 1
1








nl w P w P   (88) 
( ) 0 0 7 2
* 2 3
2








gm w P w P   (89) 
( ) 0 0 8 2
* 2
2








t w P w P   (90) 
Conditions for Scenario 4 being a Nash equilibrium 
Finally, the conditions that result in Scenario 4 being a Nash equilibrium are: 
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and can be rewritten as: 
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Determinants of the Nash Equilibrium in Labeling Strategies: Discussion  
The conditions presented above indicate that the Nash equilibrium configuration of labeling regimes in the 
countries that have adopted the GM technology depends on the relative farm prices of the GM, the 
conventional, and the non-labeled products under the different labeling scenarios, as well as on the cost of 
production under the GM and conventional technologies. The relative farm prices and costs of production 
are affected, in turn, by (i) the distribution of consumer preferences and the level of consumer aversion to 
GM products; (ii) the size of the segregation and labeling costs in the two countries; (iii) the relative 
productive efficiency and the cost effectiveness of the GM technology in these countries; (iv) the structure 
of the trading sector and the market power of the life science companies; and (v) the strength of intellectual 
property rights in these countries. 
While it is certainly the interaction of all these parameters that determines whether a profile of 
labeling strategies will constitute a Nash equilibrium or not, the rest of this section will focus on 
separating the effect of these parameters on the potential of the different labeling scenarios to constitute a 
Nash equilibrium in labeling strategies. In so doing, we are able to gain insights on the general 
environment in which each labeling configuration is likely to emerge as a Nash equilibrium.    
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Segregation and labeling costs  
Consistent with a priori expectations, expressions  1 ∆ - 4 ∆  in equations (79)-(82) fall with an increase in 
the segregation costs associated with a labeling regime indicating that the lower are these costs, the more 
likely is that countries will find it optimal to label their products. Thus, Scenario 1 is more likely to be a 
Nash equilibrium when the segregation and labeling costs are relatively low in both countries.  
When these costs are relatively high in both countries, the appeal of a non-labeling strategy 
increases and so does the likelihood that both countries will find it optimal to not label their products. 
Formally, the greater are the segregation and labeling costs, the greater are  5 ∆ , 6 ∆ , 7 ∆  and  8 ∆  in 
equations (83)-(86), and the more likely it is that Scenario 2 will emerge as the Nash equilibrium in 
labeling regimes. 
Finally, a discrepancy in the segregation and labeling costs between the two countries might 
result in different regulatory responses to products of biotechnology. The greater is the difference in 
segregation and labeling costs between the two countries, the more likely it is that these countries will 
chose different labeling regimes (with the low cost country labeling its products and the high cost country 
opting for a no labeling regime).   
Consumer aversion to GM products  
It can be shown that expressions  1 ∆ - 4 ∆  rise with an increase in the level of consumer aversion to GM 
products, indicating that the greater is the consumer opposition to GM products, the more likely it is that 
countries will find it optimal to label their products. Note that in the presence of non-labeled products in 
the market (as is the case in Scenarios 2, 3 and 4), an increase in consumer aversion reduces the demand 
for these products and causes producer welfare to fall. When GM products are segregated and labeled as 
such, the rise in consumer aversion reduces the demand for GM products while increasing the demand for 
their conventional counterparts. When consumer aversion is relatively high, all consumers will prefer the 
conventional product, and the GM (and non-labeled) products are driven out of the market. The producer  
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welfare gains from the increased demand for conventional products make the labeling regime appealing to 
countries when the consumer aversion is high.   
  On the other hand, a low level of consumer aversion to GM products reduces the appeal of labels 
and makes a non-labeling strategy more attractive. The lower is the consumer aversion to GM products, 
the greater are  5 ∆ , 6 ∆ , 7 ∆  and  8 ∆ , and the greater is the likelihood that countries will find it optimal to 
not label their products.    
Market power of the life science sector and strength of IPRs  
Both the market power by the life science sector and the strength of its IPRs affect the base cost of 
producing the GM crop,  gm w . The greater is the market power of the life science sector and/or the 
stronger is the enforcement of its IPRs, the more expensive is the GM technology (Giannakas, 2002). 
Ceteris paribus, it can then be shown that  1 ∆ ,  2 ∆ ,  3 ∆ , and  4 ∆  fall with an increase in  gm w  - the lower 
is  gm w , the more likely it is for countries to find it optimal to label their produce. The reasoning is as 
follows. A reduction in  gm w  (due to low market power of the life science sector and/or lax enforcement 
of its IPRs) increases the production share of the GM crop. The increased production share of the GM 
crop increases the utility discount factor associated with the consumption of the non-labeled product (see 
equation (26)), and reduces the consumer demand for the non-labeled product under the alternative 
Scenarios 3 and 4. Thus, the lower is the market power of the life science sector and/or the weaker is the 
enforcement of its IPRs, the less appealing is the no labeling regime, and the more likely it is that both 
countries will find it optimal to label their products.  
  Conversely, the greater is the market power of the life science sector and/or the stronger is the 
enforcement of IPRs, the less appealing is labeling, and the greater is the likelihood that countries will 
find it optimal to not label their products. Formally, the greater is  gm w , the greater are  5 ∆ , 6 ∆ , 7 ∆  and 
8 ∆ , and the greater is the likelihood that Scenario 2 will be a Nash equilibrium.   
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It follows that differences in the market power of the life science sector and/or differences in the 
strength of IPRs between the two countries can rationalize the establishment of different labeling regimes. 
In particular, a high degree of market power and/or strong IPRs in Country 1(2) combined with low 
market power and/or lax enforcement of IPRs in Country 2(1) can result in Scenario 3(4) being a Nash 
equilibrium in labeling strategies.  
Cost effectiveness of the new technology  
Similar to market power of the life science sector and the strength of IPRs, the cost effectiveness of the new 
technology affects the cost of producing the GM crop. The more cost effective is the new technology, the 
greater are  1 ∆ ,  2 ∆ ,  3 ∆ , and  4 ∆  and the more likely it is that Scenario 1 will emerge as a Nash equilibrium 
in labeling strategies. The reasoning is as follows. The greater is the cost effectiveness of the GM 
technology, the greater is the production share of GM products, the lower is the consumer demand for non-
labeled products, and the lower is the producer welfare under a no-labeling regime. Thus, the more effective 
is the new technology in reducing the costs of production, the more likely it is that countries that have 
adopted the GM technology will find it optimal to label their products.  
  It follows that a low cost effectiveness of the GM technology in both countries, enhances the 
desirability of the no labeling regime and makes the emergence of Scenario 2 as a Nash equilibrium more 
likely. On the other hand, an asymmetric effect of the GM technology on the cost of production might 
result in different labeling strategies in the two countries. In such a case, the country for which the new 
technology is highly cost effective will label its products while the country enjoying relatively small gains 
from the GM technology will opt for a no labeling regime. Thus, a high cost effectiveness of the GM 
technology in Country 1(2) combined with a low cost effectiveness in Country 2(1) can result in Scenario 
4(3) being a Nash equilibrium in labeling strategies. 
  Table 3 summarizes the conditions facilitating the different Nash equilibria in labeling strategies 




Table 3: Conditions Facilitating the Different Nash Equilibria  












-  Low segregation costs   
-  High consumer aversion to GM products 
-  High cost effectiveness of GM technology 
-  Weak IPRs  
-  Low degree of market power by the life  
   science sector 
 
Scenario 4: 
-  Low segregation costs in C.1 &  
   High segregation costs in C.2 
-  High cost effectiveness of GM technology 
    in C.1 & Low cost effectiveness in C.2 
-  Weak IPRs in C.1 & Strong IPRs in C.2  
-  Low degree of market power in C.1 &     

























-  High segregation costs in C.1 &            
   Low segregation costs in C.2 
-  Low cost effectiveness of GM technology  
    in C.1 & High cost effectiveness in C.2 
-  Strong IPRs in C.1 & Weak IPRs in C.2  
-  High degree of market power in C.1 &     
    Low market power in Country 2 
 
Scenario 2: 
-  High segregation costs  
-  Low consumer aversion to GM products 
-  Low cost effectiveness of GM technology 
-  Strong IPRs  
-  High degree of market power by the life  
   science sector 
 
 
Before concluding this section it should be emphasized that the conditions presented in Table 3 
represent depictions of the general environment in which different configurations of labeling strategies 
are likely to constitute a Nash equilibrium. Since it is the interaction of all these factors that determine 
whether a profile of labeling strategies will constitute a Nash equilibrium or not, the conditions presented 
in Table 3 should be viewed as sufficient, and not as necessary, conditions for the different labeling 
scenarios to constitute a Nash equilibrium.  
It is possible, for instance, that a low cost effectiveness of the GM technology will be present in 
an environment in which both countries label their products. This could occur when the impact of a high 
consumer aversion and/or low segregation costs and/or low market power of the life science sector and/or 
lax IPR enforcement outweigh the impact of low cost effectiveness making labeling the optimal  




This paper develops a stylized four-region model of heterogeneous producers and consumers to analyze 
the strategic interdependence between a small number of large producing countries that have adopted the 
GM technology and seek to determine their regulatory response to products of biotechnology (i.e., 
whether to label their GM and conventional produce or not). The framework of analysis developed in this 
paper builds on the published work by Giannakas and Fulton (2002) and Fulton and Giannakas (2004) 
that examine market and welfare effects of the GM technology, by placing the analysis of labeling 
decisions in a multi-country context. To our knowledge, the effect of strategic interdependence on 
countries’ labeling decisions has not been considered previously.  
The strategic interaction between the GM producing countries is modeled in this paper as a strategic 
game where the countries determine their labeling regimes non-cooperatively (i.e., independently but aware 
that their labeling strategies affect each others payoffs). In this context, the paper examines the strategic 
effects of labeling decisions and identifies the determinants of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
labeling regimes in these GM producing countries. In doing so, we are able to determine the environment in 
which each labeling configuration is likely to emerge as a Nash equilibrium i.e., the conditions under which 
the different configurations of labeling strategies can constitute a Nash equilibrium.  
Analytical results show that the Nash equilibrium configuration of labeling regimes in countries 
that have adopted the GM technology depends on (i) the distribution of consumer preferences and the 
level of consumer aversion to GM products; (ii) the size of the segregation and labeling costs in the two 
countries; (iii) the relative productive efficiency and the cost effectiveness of the GM technology in these 
countries; (iv) the structure of the trading sector and the market power of the life science companies; and 
(v) the strength of intellectual property rights in these countries.  
  Specifically, the greater (lower) is the consumer aversion to GM products and/or the smaller 
(greater) is the size of the segregation costs associated with a labeling regime in these countries and/or the 
greater (smaller) is the cost effectiveness of the new technology and/or the lower (greater) is the market 
power of the life science sector and/or the weaker (stronger) are the intellectual property rights in these  
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countries, the more likely it is that GM producing countries will find it optimal to label (not label) their 
products.  
  While a similarity in these market and agronomic characteristics leads to uniform labeling 
standards in the GM producing regions, a divergence in the segregation costs, productive efficiency, cost 
effectiveness of the GM technology, market power and/or enforcement of IPRs between the different 
countries can lead to different regulatory responses to products of biotechnology. Different market and/or 
agronomic characteristics can, therefore, provide an explanation for the different approaches to labeling 
adopted in different countries around the world. 
  In addition to providing insights on the factors affecting countries’ decisions on the regulation 
and labeling of products of biotechnology, the stylized framework of analysis developed in this paper can 
provide the basis for the economic analysis of issues like the recent introduction of mandatory labeling by 
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Figure 3: Net Returns in the Rest of the World 
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Figure 5: Determination of the Global Supply under Scenario 2 
 
 
Figure 6: Determination of Global Supplies under Scenario 4 
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Figure 7: Consumption Decisions under Scenario 1 
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Figure 8: Consumption Decisions under Scenario 2 
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Figure 9: Consumption Decisions under Scenarios 3 and 4 
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Figure 10: Market Outcomes under Scenario 1 
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Figure 13: Aggregate Producer Welfare in Country 1 under Scenarios 1 and 3  
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Figure 14: Aggregate Producer Welfare Gains in Country 2 under Scenario 1 (relative to Scenario 4)  
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